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Abstract 
 
Using a randomized trial, we evaluate the impact of Liceo Jubilar, a tuition-free private school 
providing middle school education to poor students in Montevideo, Uruguay. The research compares 
adolescents randomly selected to enter the school with those not drawn in the school lottery. Several 
features of this school –the capacity to select personnel, a culture of high expectations, a safe and 
disciplined environment, differential teaching, extended instructional time, strong parental 
involvement, and a rich offer of extracurricular activities - contrast with the country’s highly 
centralized public education system. We find large positive impacts of Liceo Jubilar on students’ 
promotion rates and academic expectations. Our results shed light on new approaches to education 
that may contribute to improve opportunities for disadvantaged adolescents in developing countries. 
 
JEL code: C93, I21, I25, I28 
Keywords: Randomized controlled trial; privately managed education; low-income populations 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The low quality of public schooling has been pointed out as one of the main barriers limiting 
the expansion and quality improvement of secondary education in the developing world (Di Gropello 
2006). In Latin America, despite significant expansions in access to secondary education in the past 
decades, low quality and high dropout rates remain a critical challenge. Almost half of Latin 
American adolescents drop out of school at some point during the secondary education cycle and 
nearly half of the 15 year olds in the region have difficulties mastering the most basic numeracy and 
reading skills (Graduate XXI 2013, Aristimuño & de Armas 2012). Other low-income countries in 
Africa and Asia that participate in international tests show deficits that put their median child at the 
bottom 15th percentile of children from richer countries (Andrabi, Das & Khwaja 2015). 
Two main trends have emerged in developing countries as a response to the low quality of 
public education: decentralization of public education and an increase in private-sector provision 
(Bruns Filmer & Patrinos 2011). In this paper we shed light on the second development by evaluating 
an innovative education model that emerged in Uruguay in the early 2000’s and that has been recently 
replicated in other regions of the country. Liceo Jubilar is a middle school that provides tuition-free 
schooling to low-income students in one of the poorest neighborhoods in Montevideo. It is financed 
by individual donations as well as corporate donations that are in return exempted from the payment 
of corporate income tax. The school has limited independence to innovate over academic contents, 
and does not differ from public schools in the observable quality or remuneration of the teachers.  
However, it operates over an extended academic schedule, has freedom to selectively hire personnel, 
uses differential teaching, provides an environment of discipline, safety, and belonging, and shows a 
strong involvement with the community.  
Our impact assessment is based on the randomization of the students who applied to enter 
Liceo Jubilar by the end of primary school (sixth grade) in 2009. Our research design exploits the 
excess of applicants over the school capacity and the fact that participants were selected randomly. 
The lack of national level standardized tests in Uruguay makes the evaluation very costly, as we have 
to apply the cognitive tests, a task particularly expensive in the case of control subjects. This explains 
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why only the lottery of one year is used. At one-year follow-up, we find that the intervention reduced 
significantly repetition and dropout rates, and had a positive impact on the students’ expectations of 
completing college.1 We are unable to find statistically significant differences in academic 
achievement, although this failure is likely due to a poor testing instrument. On the basis of 
administrative data on the school and survey data on students’ experiences and perceptions, we 
hypothesize about potential channels behind the observed effects. A smaller school, increased 
instructional time, higher peer quality, students’ perception of discipline and respect, parental 
involvement with the school, and a committed staff, are among the underscored features.  
This study has several strengths. It is one of a few investigations to analyze an innovative 
private education initiative in Latin America using an experimental design. Furthermore, it assesses a 
variety of outcomes that include not only the usual measures of academic achievement, such as 
promotion and dropout rates, but also effects on students’ and parents’ perceptions on safety, 
discipline, and belonging. These outcomes may be important for parents when choosing a school, but 
are typically overlooked. The study faces also several limitations, including the small sample size, the 
fact that the effects correspond to just one school, and the difficulties in measuring effects on learning 
outcomes. Overall, we consider that the paper sheds new light on a highly policy relevant area and 
thus makes a contribution to the existing literature.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Evidence on Privately Managed Schools  
In response to public schools' low academic performance, governments are increasingly 
experimenting with policies that cede centralized control of schools to private providers. Private 
management of public education has been implemented with varying intensity in countries such as 
Chile, Colombia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Spain, and the United States.  
Most of the evidence on privately managed schools comes from charter schools in the United 
States. Charter schools are autonomous institutions founded by teams of teachers, parents, and 
nonprofits that receive public money in exchange for concrete educational outcomes (Toma & 
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Zimmer 2012). They cannot charge tuition and are not permitted to impose admission requirements, 
and must select students by lottery if oversubscribed. A recent review by Epple, Romano & Zimmer 
(2015) shows mixed evidence on charter schools’ impacts. Results from fixed-effects studies, based 
on students switching to charter schools from public schools or vice-versa, suggest small, null, or 
even negative effects on students’ academic achievements. Findings from randomized control trials, 
on the other hand, are more supportive in general of charter schools and show in some cases large 
academic effects (Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, & Pathak 2011; Angrist Bettinger, 
Bloom, King & Kremer 2002; Hoxby & Rockoff 2005; Hoxby & Murarka 2009; Dobbie & Fryer 
2011a; Wong, Coller, Dudovitz, Kennedy, Buddin & Shapiro 2014). Moreover, these positive results 
do not seem to be a function of the type of students applying to these schools (Angrist, Pathak & 
Walters 2013). In addition, charter schools appear to improve behavioral outcomes and long-term 
outcomes such as high school graduation, college attendance and completion, and earnings (Dobbie & 
Fryer 2013; Wong, Coller, Dudovitz, Kennedy, Buddin, Shapiro & Chung 2014; Booker, Gill & 
Zimmer 2014).  
Many of the oversubscribed schools that undergo experimental evaluation and show large 
effects respond to the so-called “No Excuses” model. These schools are characterized by a small size, 
frequent testing, a long school day and year, selective teacher hiring, a strong student workload, and 
the imposition of strict discipline (Abulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane & Pathak 2011). 
Qualitative and quantitative evidence on charter networks such as KIPP, Harlem Children’s Zone, and 
Success Academy (Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, Pathak & Walters 2010; Dobbie and Fryer 2011a; 
Dobbie and Fryer 2011b; Taylor 2015), as well as some interventions that inject “No Excuses” 
strategies in public schools (Fryer 2014) suggest that the learning effects in these schools are related 
to the substantial pressure on students, teachers and parents regarding academic outcomes and 
expected behaviors. 
The evidence on privately managed schools in Latin America is scarcer. Observational studies 
on Fe y Alegría schools, a religious denominational network present in 16 Latin American countries,2 
show that students in these schools achieve higher academic outcomes than comparable low-income 
students in public schools (Alcázar & Valdivia 2005; Alcott & Ortega 2009; Osorio & Wodon, 2010). 
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Another private contracting experience, the “Concession Schools” in Bogotá, Colombia, also shows 
evidence of positive results for low-income students in standardized tests and school completion rates 
(Barrera-Osorio 2007). The program gives well- established, private providers, the concession of 
schools in low-income areas. Principals are allowed certain independence in the selection of personnel 
and complete freedom in the choice of the pedagogic model. In both school approaches, better 
academic achievement has been attributed to community involvement, extracurricular activities, labor 
contract flexibility, and a decentralized administrative structure. 
A third piece of evidence in Latin America is linked to the voucher experiences in Colombia 
and Chile. In these countries, governments distribute vouchers that partially finance the costs of 
education, giving low-income students the opportunity to attend private schools. Randomized 
evaluations of the Colombian experience show significant impacts of vouchers on academic 
outcomes, both in the short run, as captured by lower repetition rates, as in the long run, through 
better results in college admission tests and higher wages (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King & Kremer 
2002; Angrist, Bettinger & Kremer 2006). Positive results have been attributed to the effects of 
competition and higher accountability on the quality of participating schools and to the stronger 
incentives faced by the students, as vouchers are only renewable upon the achievement of academic 
success. In the case of Chile, some authors report positive results on test scores and pre-college 
admission tests, and others find no average differences with public schools (Gallegos 2006). Catholic 
schools appear to fare better than other private schools. 
In terms of other developing regions, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2014) report findings 
of an experimental evaluation of a voucher program in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. They do 
not find evidence of better results in math or Tuguru (the local language), but find improved outcomes 
in English, Hindi, social studies, and science, disciplines in which these private schools spend more 
hours. These gains are attained, in addition, at lower costs than the public alternative. Kim, Alderman 
& Orazem (1999) evaluate the Quetta Urban Fellowship Program, a program paying subsidies per girl 
enrolled directly to new private primary schools with female teachers established in poor urban areas 
in Pakistan. They find substantial increases in girls’ enrollment and also lower costs of the fellowship 
school relative to government schools.  
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2.2 Liceo Jubilar 
The school under evaluation, Liceo Jubilar, is a tuition-free privately managed middle school 
in Montevideo that offers middle education to students below the poverty line.3 After its inception in 
2002, several other private schools have emerged following the same model. The school is financed 
with donations from individuals and corporations that are exempted from corporate income tax. This 
exemption operates in practice as an indirect source of government funding. Specifically, for every 
corporate donation of $100 to a privately managed school, the firm ends up paying $18.75 and the 
government provides $81.25 in the form of resigned taxes.4 The school also receives some direct 
funding from the government (National Institute of Children and Adolescents, INAU) to finance 
extracurricular activities. Parents are required to contribute financially within their means, but these 
contributions are insignificant.  
Liceo Jubilar is located in Casavalle, one of the poorest neighborhoods in Montevideo, with 
an adolescent poverty rate of almost 75% and a high school completion rate of 8% in 2009 
(Uruguayan Household Survey). Students are taught the national school curriculum in the mornings, 
and are required to take extracurricular courses and to choose among several instructional and 
recreational workshops in the afternoons. For the school to be credited by the National Education 
Authority, it must comply with the subjects, contents, time assignments, and schedules of the national 
curriculum. This implies that the school does not differ from public schools in terms of its academic 
content. Liceo Jubilar has a catholic religious affiliation, but participation in religious activities is 
voluntary for the students. 
Regarding traditional school inputs, Liceo Jubilar is much smaller than the regular average 
school. The size of a cohort is 70 in Liceo Jubilar versus 382 in public schools and the full size of the 
school is 210 students. On the other hand, the average class size in Liceo Jubilar is larger than in 
comparable schools (35 vs. 31 students per class). Another difference is the length of the school day 
and year. Students in Liceo Jubilar spend 2.6 more hours per day at school than control subjects 
(whose average is 6). 5 According to administrative data, the length of the academic year is 210 days 
in Liceo Jubilar, 20% above the academic year in regular public schools. Students attending Liceo 
Jubilar also spend less time than control students travelling from home to school: it takes them on 
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average 6 minutes less to get to school daily, compared to 18 minutes on average for the control group 
subjects. This difference can be explained by the school’s policy of excluding applicants that do not 
live in the neighborhood and by the insufficient supply of public schooling options in the 
neighborhood. On the other hand, Liceo Jubilar’ criterion of not allowing applications of students 
exceeding their grade-appropriate age by more than one year, ends up affecting differentially the peer 
body of treatment and control subjects. Students in the treatment category share a student body that is 
better accomplished in terms of academic development. In the assessed public schools, the fraction of 
students exceeding the grade appropriate age by 1 year is 28% and the fraction exceeding the grade 
appropriate age by 2 or more years is 32%. For Liceo Jubilar, these rates are 20% and 0% 
respectively. 
Liceo Jubilar is closely involved with the community. Parents are required to participate in at 
least one committee (cleaning, school maintenance, meals, outings) throughout the year, and at least 
one adult in the family is expected to be accountable for the student’s behavior and academic 
development. This involvement contrasts with parents’ committees in public schools, which have low 
rates of participation and can barely participate in school daily activities. Finally, and unlike public 
schools, Liceo Jubilar can selectively hire and dismiss teachers, and can assign teachers’ workload 
flexibly to teaching, coordination, and training.6   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Ever since its inception, average dropout and repetition rates have been below 2% in Liceo 
Jubilar, compared to an average repetition of 26% in the school’s neighboring area and less than 40% 
of adolescents attending school after the age of 15 (INE 2009). This simple comparison of means is 
likely to capture not only Liceo Jubilar's impact, but also differences in the baseline characteristics of 
the populations compared (selection bias). For example, public schools are more likely to enroll 
students of higher socioeconomic status than Liceo Jubilar, suggesting a negative selection bias. On 
the other hand, students who apply to Liceo Jubilar probably exceed other youth of similar 
socioeconomic status in terms of their motivation, perception of the value of education, and family 
support. This feature could bias the impact estimates upwards if selection bias were not adequately 
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addressed. We overcome selection problems by exploiting the fact that the number of subscriptions 
for Liceo Jubilar exceeds the placements available, and that students are selected by lottery. This 
allocation rule ensures that the group of students randomly assigned to enter Liceo Jubilar is similar at 
baseline to the group of adolescents not drawn in the lottery.  
3.1 Data collection 
In September 2009, Liceo Jubilar opened an enrollment window inviting families of children 
in the last year of primary school to apply for a placement at the school. The school had 70 places 
available (two classes of 35 students). Applications were received from 172 students, 43 of which 
were rejected because they exceeded the grade-appropriate age by two years or more, did not live in 
the neighborhood, or had a household income above the poverty threshold. Out of the remaining 129 
applications, 28 students were automatically chosen to enter the school, primarily because they were 
siblings of current or former students. This left a remaining waiting list of 101 candidates who were 
randomly assigned to meet the quota of 42 places in December 2009. 
Randomization was stratified on the basis of gender, two categories of household income 
(high and low), and two categories of achievement in the Liceo Jubilar’s baseline placement test. 
Before the lotteries were drawn in November 2009, the applicants completed a baseline self-
administered survey at Liceo Jubilar. The questionnaire inquired about demographics, academic 
performance, academic expectations, risky behaviors, and habits. An additional survey was 
administered by school staff to parents or family referents, covering family structure, education, 
income, and occupation, among other socioeconomic characteristics.  
Insert Table 1 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the group of adolescents subject to the lottery, for 
adolescents excluded a priori from the selection process, and for students who were directly admitted 
to enter Liceo Jubilar. In addition to analyzing differences between these groups, we compare the 
household characteristics of the students participating in the lottery with those of a nationally 
representative sample of households with children aged 18 or less (Uruguayan Continuous Household 
Survey, INE 2009). 
Column (1) shows that the average age of students who participated in the lottery was 12 in 
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December 2009. The fraction of boys was 45%. Seventy percent had attended primary public school 
while the rest had gone to highly subsidized private schools in the neighborhood. Almost 40% showed 
poor academic performance in the school’s placement exam. Half of the children reported being 
Catholic, 7% claimed other faiths, and the rest reported no religious beliefs. Over 50% of children 
lived with both their parents at the time of the initial survey, about 20% lived only with their mother, 
and the rest lived with their mother and stepfather, or with their mother and other relatives. Only 5% 
of household heads reported not working. The average monthly household income was $ 12,100 
Uruguayan pesos (2010 currency), approximately $ 605 US dollars. A high proportion of households 
were recipients of social benefits that included cash transfers and a food card.  
Column (2) shows descriptive statistics for adolescents excluded from the selection process, 
and column (5) reports the differences between this group and those subject to the lottery.7 The table 
shows that those excluded from the selection process were on average half a year older than lottery 
participants, were less likely to be good or excellent students according to their self-reported GPA for 
5th grade, their likelihood of having repeated a year was 5 times higher than that of the group subject 
to the lottery, and the result of the placement examination was on average 10% lower. These 
adolescents also showed a lower likelihood of being catholic and had higher family incomes.  
Column (3) depicts the same variables for those who entered Liceo Jubilar without going 
through the lottery. When compared with the group subject to the lottery (see differences in column 
(6)), these students show a better performance in Liceo Jubilar’s placement examination but do not 
show statistically significant differences in other variables. Because most of those entering the school 
without a lottery are siblings of past students, these better results may reflect positive spillovers of 
these past students and their parents on entering students. It also raises the issue of the quality of the 
peer group:  students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar are facing a better quality peer group 
than those not selected. 
Column (4) shows average household characteristics for families with at least one child aged 
18 or less in a nationally representative sample obtained from the 2009 Uruguayan Continuous 
Household Survey. Families of applicants to Liceo Jubilar are larger and less likely to be intact than 
the average Uruguayan family with children. Families of the randomized students also show lower 
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levels of education and income. The percentage of household heads that did not complete primary 
school was 30% in the sample of students participating in the lottery versus 6% in the nationally 
representative sample. Regarding income, families applying to Liceo Jubilar reported an average 
monthly income of $12,000 Uruguayan pesos (US$ 600) versus $31,000 (US$ 1,500) in the sample 
representative of Uruguayan households with children. These income levels place the families 
applying to Liceo Jubilar in the 15th percentile of the country's income distribution. On the other hand, 
household heads in the sample subject to randomization are more likely to work and less likely to 
receive transfers from the government. 
Insert Table 2 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for adolescents selected by lottery to enter Liceo Jubilar in 
March 2010 (treatment group) as well as non-drafted applicants (control group). As expected because 
of the randomized selection design, treatment and control subjects did not differ significantly in their 
baseline characteristics.  
 A first-year follow-up round was conducted in November-December 2010. The assessment 
included a home interview that inquired about academic achievement, perceptions about school, use 
of time, values, satisfaction and expectations, and health status; a self-administered questionnaire with 
sensitive questions on crime and delinquency, substance use, and sexual behavior; and a brief parent 
questionnaire regarding parental beliefs about the school and updates on socio-demographics. 
In addition, study subjects participated in a Math and Spanish standardized test. These tests 
had been designed by the Uruguayan Public Education Authorities (Asociación Nacional de 
Educación Pública 2010) using publicly released items from the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and had been administered to students in a sample of 36 public middle schools in 
2009. Finally, the adolescents were contacted by phone at the beginning of the new school year (end 
of March 2011) to inquire about final promotion outcomes and current school attendance.  
3.2 Sample size and attrition 
The analyzed cohort of students consists of 100 participants, 42 in the randomly selected 
group and 58 in the control group.8 Two students in the control group failed to answer the household 
survey. In addition nine students in the control group and 2 in the treatment were missing information 
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on some of the questions about school climate and school characteristics. This differential pattern of 
responses across treatment status is statistically significant. Still, a comparison of baseline 
characteristics across treatment status for subjects with non-missing responses shows that this 
restricted sample is balanced (see Appendix Table 1), suggesting randomness in missing responses. 
For consistency, we run our analysis considering only those with non-missing values in the household 
survey (N=87). Finally, 6 subjects in the control group and 1 in the treatment group did not participate 
in the Math and Spanish tests. This difference in attrition is statistically significant at a 6% level. In 
Appendix Table 2 we show that there are no statistically significant differences in baseline 
characteristics between treatment and control subjects that completed the tests (N=93).  
3.3 Impact Evaluation 
The analysis in this paper compares one-year outcomes for treated subjects versus control 
subjects. All subjects in the control group ended up attending public schools when not drafted.9 These 
schools are the yardstick against which we are comparing Liceo Jubilar’s outcomes. Two public 
schools concentrated 40% of the control group’s enrollment; all other control adolescents were 
distributed across 13 other public schools.  
The main academic outcomes to be compared are enrollment, progression, school attendance, 
and standardized tests results. We also consider students’ expectations about future education and 
perceptions of school safety, discipline, and belonging as relevant outcomes.  
The simplest way to estimate the average treatment effect is by conducting a regression of 
each outcome on the coefficient of the treatment dummy, i.e. a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the adolescent attended Liceo Jubilar and 0 otherwise. However, one of the participants 
initially selected to enter Liceo Jubilar ended up not attending the school and two subjects from the 
control group ended up attending. Thus, the group of those that were finally treated differs slightly 
from those initially selected to be treated (the Intention to Treat or ITT group). A simple Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression using effective treatment as the explanatory variable of interest may 
introduce bias if selection into and out of the treatment group is not random. We thus use the indicator 
of random selection into treatment (ITT) as the relevant explanatory variable, and refer in the text and 
tables to “treatment” as those with ITT=1 and “control” as those with ITT=0. In a robustness check, 
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we run adjusted regressions and instrumental variables regressions using the ITT indicator as an 
instrument for effective participation. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
One concern when conducting randomized experiments is the possibility of contamination 
across subjects in the different treatment categories. The fact that subjects in treatment and control 
groups live in the same neighborhood could raise concerns about an indirect effect on control 
adolescents through friendships with Liceo Jubilar’s students. While the existence of those spillovers 
would underestimate the true effect, we believe it to be unlikely. Due to the extended number of hours 
that students spend at school and to the different cultures between Liceo Jubilar and the public system, 
most students in Liceo Jubilar end up hanging out with their school peers.  
Another potential source of bias would arise if students in Liceo Jubilar entered the school 
with previous spillover effects through older siblings (and indirectly, through their parents). In our 
study, students with siblings in Liceo Jubilar were automatically accepted at school and did not 
participate in the lottery. This strategy minimizes the risk of this other type of contamination. 
3.4 Costs 
We compute running costs per student for the academic year 2010 on the basis of data 
provided by the school (see Appendix Table 2). All costs are in 2010 US dollars. The academic staff 
is reimbursed at rates similar to those paid in public school. The annual cost of the academic and 
technical staff (which includes the school administrators, academic coordinators, teachers, a 
psychologist, and a social worker) is $ 1,113 per student. Utilities and other services account for an 
additional $ 488 per student.   
Regular activities in the afternoon include music, cooking, crafts, dancing, sports, a reading 
club, and remedial education or tutoring. All afternoon activities are led by unreimbursed volunteers. 
To attach a price to these services, we computed the number of hours for each volunteer and imputed 
a market price per hour to the activity. We also considered the time cost of individual volunteers 
involved in non-regular activities, such as aid with enrollment or end of the year activities, and the 
cost of school trips and outings. The total annual cost of extracurricular activities is $ 973 per student. 
Other resources include books, uniforms and other school supplies offered to students free of 
charge, free breakfasts and lunches, and parental time in school committees. Because most of these 
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items are donated in-kind, we computed their opportunity cost taking into account market prices.10 
Our estimates indicate these items amount to $ 799 per student per year.  
According to the above estimates, the total running cost for the school in 2010 was $ 3,373 
per student. This number fails to capture other opportunity costs, such as the cost of infrastructure, 
non-regular in kind donations and activities aimed at improving adult education or promoting links 
with the community. On the other hand, some of the resources accounted for above (such as 
coordination and management hours, utilities, and other services) are also allocated to parallel 
ongoing programs, specifically alumni support and community workshops, which should be 
subtracted from the aggregate estimate. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Educational Outcomes 
Table 3 shows the estimates of treatment status on 1st year students’ educational outcomes. 
Each row depicts an outcome. The first and second columns show mean values for treatment and 
control subjects. Columns (4) and (5) display, respectively, the difference across treatment status, and 
its heteroscedasticity-robust standard error. The last column displays the number of observations. 
Insert Table 3 
Results show that the intervention did not affect enrollment in school one year after the 
initiation of the intervention. Yet, treatment status significantly affected progression in school: 98% of 
treated subjects were promoted to second grade, versus 79% of controls, a difference of 18.7 
percentage points. Part of this difference has to do with Liceo Jubilar’s ability to retain students 
during the year. Students in Jubilar had a lower likelihood of quitting school before the end of the year 
by 8.8 percentage points in 2010, a decrease of 100% relative to the quitting rate in the control group. 
Most quitters were female and most of them reported informally they had abandoned school because 
of violent or unsafe incidents. The lack of statistically significant differences in enrollment in 2011 
shows that school abandonment in 2010 was transitory: most of the quitters re-enrolled in school in 
2011. This behavior is quite expected, considering that low socioeconomic status families receive 
cash transfers that are conditional on school enrollment, but not on school attendance. Although not 
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depicted in the table, repetition rates were smaller by a statistically significant magnitude in Liceo 
Jubilar even without considering those who abandoned school. Finally, treated students were less 
likely to be absent during the year in spite of a longer school year.  
Regarding cognitive skills, treatment subjects had slightly higher scores in Math and Spanish, 
but these differences were not statistically significant. The administered tests were too noisy and the 
sample size too small to identify differences across treatment and control subjects. These tests were 
elaborated by the Uruguayan Public Education Authorities on the basis of publicly released PISA 
items, and were administered to 36 public middle schools in Uruguay in 2009. While they were in 
principle designed to test Math and Spanish levels for the Uruguayan 13 year old population, 
performance was very poor even for the public education sample. The average rate of correct answers 
was 30%, suggesting a poorly designed test with low discriminating power. The fraction of correct 
responses among our sample was 27%. 
4.2 Educational Expectations and Perceptions on School Climate 
The following results, displayed in Tables 4 and 5, are restricted to 87 subjects that were 
administered the household survey and that had non-missing responses in a set of selected outcomes. 
Table 4 reports treatment effects on educational expectations and perceptions on school climate and 
Table 5 shows differences by treatment status in parental involvement and extracurricular activities. 
All students abandoning school before the end of the academic year were excluded because they did 
not answer questions inquiring about school characteristics and climate. Assuming that school 
dropouts would in principle have worse expectations, perceptions, and school involvement, our 
estimates would be conservative. 
Insert Table 4 
The results in the first two rows of Table 4 show treatment effects on students’ and parents’ 
expectations about future education. Treatment status is associated with a 28 percentage-point 
increase in a student’s expectations of completing college, almost double the expectations of the 
control group. There is also evidence that the treatment increased parents’ expectations about their 
children’s likelihood of completing college: the difference by treatment status is 0.224, significant at a 
5% level.   
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In terms of school climate, both students and their parents perceive that Liceo Jubilar offers a 
safer environment. We already mentioned anecdotal evidence that pointed to safety as one of the 
critical issues behind school abandonment. Students in the treatment group are 13 percentage points 
more likely to feel safe at school than comparison students, and parents of these students are 30 
percentage points more likely to think their child is safe at school. Both effects are statistically 
significant at a 5% level. There are striking differences in perceptions of discipline by treatment 
status. Treated students are 32 percentage points more likely than control subjects to believe that 
“students in their school respect the teachers and staff, and that there is a disciplined environment”. 
Furthermore, only 48% of control subjects believe that students in their school can resolve conflicts 
without fights, offenses, or threats. The rate among treatment school students is 81%. The data also 
reveals a higher rate of suspensions from school for control students, suggesting either more tolerance 
on the part of Liceo Jubilar or that students tend to misbehave more in less disciplined environments. 
All these “discipline” effects are statistically significant at a 5% level. In terms of school belonging, a 
higher fraction of treatment subjects reports feeling happy at school: attending Liceo Jubilar increases 
this perception by 13 percentage points, from a baseline rate of 85%.   
The large differences in students’ and parents’ perceptions, plus the fact that many of the 
perceptions are close to 100% for treatment subjects raises the issue of family preferences for schools 
and the degree to which parents value factors such as discipline and safety, in addition to academic 
achievement, in their schooling choices. 
4.3 Parental involvement and extracurricular activities 
Table 5 explores effects on parental involvement and extracurricular activities. Most parents 
in the treatment group believe that the school is a source of support when they encounter problems. 
This rate is less than half for parents of children in public schools. In addition, all parents in Liceo 
Jubilar get involved in some way with school activities, whereas only six out of 10 parents of public 
school students report collaborating with school activities. 
Insert Table 5 
There are statistically significant differences also in students’ involvement in extracurricular 
activities. Students in the treatment group are more likely to participate in religion workshops, 
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community service activities, tutoring, and job market workshops. Twenty-two percent of treatment 
students report receiving some kind of tutoring and 41% report participating in job market workshops. 
The rates are both 4% for control subjects. The average number of extra-curricular activities is 3.9 for 
treatment students and 1.9 for control subjects.  
4.4 Sensitivity and Robustness 
Results were re-estimated using OLS regressions adjusting for a set of pre-determined 
covariates (parental education, pre-test results, gender and household asset index). We also run 
instrumental variables regression using the intention to treat as instrument for the treatment. The 
different methods produce minor differences in the estimated effects and standard errors, and do not 
change the conclusions reported above. We also computed, for robustness, Holm-Bonferroni 
familywise adjusted p-values (Holm 1979), to account for randomness in families of outcomes. 
Results are quite similar with these adjusted statistics. Authors can make these results available upon 
request. 
4.5 Cost effectiveness 
A cost-effectiveness analysis assesses the incremental opportunity costs associated with the 
differential impact of an intervention. The annual accounting running costs in Liceo Jubilar were US$ 
1,601 per student in 2010. These costs consider expenditures on academic and technical staff, as well 
as on utilities and other services, but do not take into account in-kind donations (food, books, and 
other supplies) and volunteer time in the afternoons. When these are assigned an opportunity cost, the 
school’s total running costs are estimated at $ 3,373. Data from the National Administration of Public 
Schools reveals that in 2008 the average running cost of a public middle school was $ 1,279 per 
student per year. If we convert this figure to 2010 currency - considering dollar inflation in Uruguay 
between 2008 and 2010 - the amount is $ 1,470. On the other hand, some students in the control group 
attend after-school programs offering academic tutoring, sports, and/or a range of workshops (ICT, 
job training, and crafts). Most of these programs are privately provided but publicly financed by the 
Uruguayan Institute for Children and Adolescents (INAU). These programs were paid in 2010 a fee of 
$ 1,300 for each enrolled adolescent. Because only a fraction of the control subjects (15%) attend 
after-school programs, the total government expenditure on the average student in the control group is 
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$ 1,470 + 195 (1,300 X 0.15) = $1,665. Thus, the incremental running cost of Liceo Jubilar’s program 
per student per year is $ 3,373- 1,665 = $ 1,708. The incremental effect on promotion is obtained from 
the estimates in Table 3, 2nd row: the intervention improves the likelihood of school progression by 
18.7 percentage points. Thus, a one-percentage point increase in promotion rates is associated in this 
population with an incremental expenditure of $ 91.3 per student per year. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
At one year from treatment initiation, we find a strong impact of Liceo Jubilar on students’ 
academic progression and expectations. Part of this improvement is due to the fact that none of the 
students in Liceo Jubilar abandoned school before the end of the academic year. In contrast, a fraction 
of those in the control group that repeated 1st grade had dropped out at an early stage of the year. The 
transition between elementary and middle school in Uruguay is one of the most critical stages in the 
education system, with average repetition rates in public schools of 40%. At a minimum, the 
personalized and disciplined environment of Liceo Jubilar contributed to deter the most critical cases 
from leaving school.  
Unfortunately, due to imprecise tests and to the small sample size we are unable to say much 
about academic achievement. There are a couple of reasons to believe that improvements in academic 
progression were due to increases in learning among students in the evaluated school, rather than to 
the use of lower thresholds to determine which students would repeat the grade. First, a comparison of 
students that had to take subject examinations after the summer due to insufficient grades shows that 
Liceo Jubilar had a smaller proportion having to take 3 or less exams. Students with less than 3 exams 
are not at risk of repeating the year. While this comparison is not statistically significant, it may be 
taken as anecdotal evidence that students were improving throughout all the distribution and not only 
at the margins of repetition. Second, students at Liceo Jubilar were less likely to be absent and more 
likely to receive tutoring, suggesting a more intense and differentiated exposure to learning.  
The large effects observed on students’ and parents’ academic expectations indicate that 
Liceo Jubilar promotes a culture of high expectations. Positive expectations about the future have 
been identified as protective factors for urban children under stress, and have been related to 
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resilience, social adjustment and wellbeing in general (Wyman, Cowen, Work & Kerley 1993). 
Higher expectations may have contributed towards improved academic progression.  
Our results also show a striking disparity by treatment status in students’ perceptions of 
safety, discipline, and conflict resolution at school. The large majority of students in the control group 
believe that conflicts at school cannot be solved without fights, insults, or threats. The pattern is 
reversed for treatment students. Liceo Jubilar’s closeness to students’ environments and its internal 
atmosphere of cohesion appear to operate as protective factors, contributing to keep students at 
school.  
Regarding peer quality, the lower likelihood of having peers with inappropriate age for the 
grade is a direct consequence of the school’s admission criterion of not accepting students that 
repeated a grade more than once. In addition, baseline comparisons show that the group of students 
directly selected to enter the school had better results in the pre-test than students subject to 
randomization (probably due to spillovers from siblings that had previously attended the school and 
their parents). One could argue that the school’s effects on repetition and expectations are simply due 
to the positive influence of higher achieving or more motivated peers on their fellow students. On the 
other hand, the school’s selection criterion of accepting only students below the poverty line tends to 
counterbalance this argument. The average student in public schools has a smaller family, is more 
likely to live with both biological parents, and shows higher levels of family education and income 
than students in Liceo Jubilar (as reported in the initial comparison with the Uruguayan household 
survey). The sign of the peer effect is, thus, ambiguous. 
Finally, a study of the organizational structure of Liceo Jubilar and other 39 public and private 
schools suggests that the leading role of the principal, and the capacity of the management team to 
involve and motivate teachers could be behind the identified treatment school effects (Assandri, 
Podestá, Sarasola, & Troncoso, 2010).  
Our analysis of school characteristics reveals that Liceo Jubilar shares many of the “No 
Excuses” features that have been identified as key inputs in the success of privately managed urban 
schools in the US, namely, a small size, a long day and year, a culture of high expectations, the ability 
to selectively hire teachers, an environment of strict discipline, and differentiated teaching 
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(Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, & Pathak 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011b). We are unable 
to assess, however, the extent to which frequent testing, a strong student workload, and academic 
pressure, some of the most cited features of No Excuses models, play an important role in Liceo 
Jubilar’s pedagogic approach. On the one hand, Liceo Jubilar does not seem to employ polarizing 
tactics used in some No Excuses charters, such as publishing students’ performance on the hallway 
and displaying students below grade level in a red zone (Taylor 2015). These differences in 
approaches may explain why the “No Excuses” model generates high exit rates of students, whereas 
the evaluated school has virtually a zero exit rate. On the other hand, we are aware of the school’s 
effort to employ differential strategies that may improve academic achievement, such as the hiring of 
experts in psychology and pedagogy, the use of alumni to tutor current students, and investments in 
teachers’ training. Because of the poor discriminating quality of the assessments used in this 
evaluation, we are unable to infer much about Liceo Jubilar’s learning outcomes. We are in the 
process of evaluating the third year outcomes, where we used improved Math and Spanish test, and 
expect to be able to say more about academic achievement in such instance.  
Despite this drawback, our analysis seems to emphasize the school’s orientation towards the 
adoption of certain values and the provision of a nurturing and safe environment to students. Liceo 
Jubilar may be more likely than some “No Excuses” models to focus on a range of socio-emotional 
skills as a primary objective in itself, not placing unique importance on academic achievement. The 
high rates of oversubscription as well as parents’ and students’ satisfaction with the school may 
indicate a value for discipline, nurturing, and safety in addition to academic outcomes. In this sense, 
the evaluated school could be potentially closer to catholic schools that have been evaluated in the 
literature, such as Fe y Alegria schools or catholic voucher schools in Chile. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Policymakers in developing countries seem to agree on the urgent need to improve the quality 
of education, enhance human capital trajectories, and promote equality of opportunities (Adriazola, 
Macedo, Katzkowiz & Salgado 2005). Decentralization of public schools and private provision of 
schooling are alternatives being discussed and implemented in many countries.  
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There is little rigorous evidence in Latin America on the impact of privately managed schools 
on low-income adolescents. Using a randomized design, we study the impact of a private tuition-free 
middle school on the academic outcomes of poor students. Our evaluation follows up and compares a 
cohort of 1stgrade middle school students that were randomly assigned to attend this privately 
managed school or to attend public schools as usual. Our analysis also quantifies the incremental costs 
associated with the school’s improved promotion rates, relative to the control group’s alternative.  
Based on administrative data and students’ and parents’ surveys, we explore channels that 
may explain the treatment effect on educational outcomes. While we cannot disentangle a single 
mechanism, the school features several characteristics also found in “No Excuses” schools and 
responsible for large academic gains in other countries: extended instructional time, differentiated 
teaching, a culture of high expectations, and an involved and motivated staff, probably associated with 
the school’s flexibility to hire and fire teachers. The school shares also features that are present in 
other successful private initiatives and are likely to be valued by parents as competing outcomes: a 
safe and disciplined environment, close parental involvement, and extracurricular activities.11  
The external validity of our conclusions is limited in principle to families similar to those that 
signed up for a placement in Liceo Jubilar and that satisfy Liceo Jubilar’s inclusion criteria. In other 
words, our conclusions can only be extrapolated to adolescents that do not exceed the grade-
appropriate age in more than a year, and that come from poor families with enough motivation to seek 
for better education alternatives. Despite this selectivity, we believe that the analysis of this 
experience can provide tools to policy makers and educators that want to pursue the road of higher 
center autonomy and decentralization. The extension of public funding to privately managed schools 
or the application of some of these strategies to more autonomous public schools could be alternative 
promising pathways to improve academic outcomes for poor adolescents in developing countries.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics at Baseline. 
 Randomized 
candidates 
Excluded 
candidates 
Candi-
dates 
selected 
a priori 
Households 
w/ children 
ECH09 
Dif. (2)-(1) Dif. (3)-(1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Demographic characteristics 
      Age 12.259 12.708 12.215 
 
0.449** -0.045 
Male 0.450 0.512 0.577 
 
0.062 0.127 
Academic indicators 
      Preschool 0.733 0.621 0.714 
 
-0.112 -0.018 
Public primary 0.707 0.719 0.692 
 
0.012 -0.015 
After-school programs (if public sch) 0.313 0.382 0.308 
 
0.069 -0.005 
Good/excellent student 0.460 0.235 0.423 
 
-0.225* -0.037 
Average/regular student 0.440 0.618 0.500 
 
0.178* 0.060 
Bad student 0.100 0.147 0.077 
 
0.047 -0.023 
Repeated at least one grade 0.170 0.349 0.077 
 
0.179** -0.093 
Results from pre-test 4.802 4.421 5.680 
 
-0.381# 0.878** 
Less than 4 in pre-test 0.396 0.526 0.200 
 
0.130# -0.196* 
Religion 
      Catholic 0.500 0.176 0.423 
 
-0.324** -0.077 
Other religions 0.071 0.088 0.115 
 
0.017 0.044 
Household environment 
      Number of people at home 4.460 4.412 5.231 4.157 -0.048 0.771* 
Both parents at home 0.560 0.676 0.577 0.629 0.116 0.017 
Only one parent at home 0.190 0.176 0.077 0.367 -0.014 -0.113 
House owner 0.571 0.600 0.654 0.568 0.029 0.082 
Parents' education: primary only 0.303 0.400 0.308 0.058 0.097 0.005 
Parents's education: < high school 0.566 0.467 0.577 0.630 -0.099 0.011 
Parents' education: high school grad 0.131 0.133 0.115 0.312 0.002 -0.016 
Head of houshold works 0.949 0.933 0.885 0.810 -0.016 -0.065 
Household income (2010 US$)^ 605.4 766.6 541.0 1574.1 161.2** -64.4 
Durable goods index 0.319 0.306 0.292 0.383 -0.013 -0.027 
Cash transfers from government 0.495 0.467 0.615 0.613 -0.028 0.120 
Max N 100 43 26 18648 
 
  
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
^ The exchange rate in 2010 was 20 Uruguayan pesos por every US dollar. 
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Table 2. Mean Comparison of Baseline Characteristics. Group Subject to  Randomization. 
  Treatment Control Difference Std. Error N 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Demographic characteristics 
     Age 12.291 12.235    0.056    (0.098)   95 
Male 0.419 0.474   -0.055    (0.101)   100 
Academic indicators 
     Preschool 0.769 0.702    0.067    (0.096)   86 
Public primary 0.721 0.696    0.025    (0.093)   99 
After-school programs  0.349 0.286    0.063    (0.095)   99 
Good/excellent student 0.535 0.404    0.131    (0.101)   100 
Average/regular student 0.372 0.491   -0.119    (0.100)   100 
Bad student 0.093 0.105   -0.012    (0.061)   100 
Repeated at least one grade 0.162 0.175   -0.013    (0.076)   100 
Results from pre-test 4.929 4.704    0.225    (0.311)   96 
Less than 4 in pre-test 0.349 0.404   -0.055    (0.098)   100 
Religion 
     Catholic 0.559 0.455    0.104    (0.102)   98 
Other religions 0.070 0.073   -0.003    (0.053)   98 
Household environment 
     Number of people at home 4.465 4.456    0.009    (0.309)   100 
Both parents at home 0.558 0.561   -0.003    (0.101)   100 
Only one parent at home 0.163 0.211   -0.048    (0.079)   100 
House owner 0.190 0.125    0.065    (0.076)   98 
Parents' education: primary only 0.628 0.518    0.110    (0.100)   99 
Parents' education: high school grad 0.116 0.143   -0.027    (0.068)   99 
Head of houshold works 0.814 0.786    0.028    (0.082)   99 
Household income (in 2010 US$)^ 566.1 635.1 -69.1 (57.3) 100 
Durable goods index 0.343 0.301    0.042    (0.036)   100 
Cash transfers from government 0.488 0.500   -0.012    (0.102)   99 
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
^ The exchange rate in 2010 was 20 Uruguayan pesos por every US dollar. 
Treatment subjects are students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar; control subjects are students that participated in the lottery but 
were not drafted.  
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Table 3. Effects on Educational Outcomes. 
  Treatment Control Difference Std. Error N 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Enrollment, assistance and progression 
     Enrollment: Enrolled in 2011 1.000 0.965 0.035  (0.025)        100   
Progression: Enrolled in second grade in 2011 0.976 0.789 0.187**  (0.059)        100   
Abandoned school before the end of the year 
in 2010 0.000 0.088 -0.088** (0.008)      100 
% days absent in 2010 0.037 0.057 -0.019* (0.014)       93 
Academic achievement 
     Test scores in Math 0.040 -0.033 0.073  (0.206)         93   
Test scores in Spanish 0.162 -0.133 0.295  (0.211)         93   
Average academic achievement 0.066 -0.055 0.121  (0.207)         93   
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
Treatment subjects are students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar; control subjects are students that participated in the lottery but 
were not drafted.  
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Table 4. Effects on educational expectations and perceptions on school climate.  
  Treatment Control Difference Std. Error N 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Educational Expectations 
     Student expects to complete college 0.585 0.304    0.281**  (0.104)   87  
Parent expects child to complete college 0.659 0.435    0.224*   (0.105)   87  
Perceptions on School Climate 
     Safety 1 - Student feels safe at school 1.000 0.870    0.130*   (0.050)   87  
Safety 2 - Parent thinks student is safe at school 0.976 0.674    0.302**  (0.074)   87  
Discipline 1 - Climate of respect and discipline at school 0.902 0.587    0.315**  (0.087)   87  
Discipline 2 - Conflicts solved without fights or threats 0.805 0.348    0.457**  (0.095)   87  
Discipline 3 - Suspensions from school in 2010 0.000 0.152   -0.152**  (0.054)   87  
Belonging 1 - Student feels happy at school 0.976 0.848    0.128*   (0.059)   87  
Belonging 2 - Student talks to educators about concerns 1.000 0.957    0.043    (0.030)   87  
      
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
(1) Sample of home interview respondents with non-missing ítems. 
(2) Treatment subjects are students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar; control subjects are students that participated in the lottery but 
were not drafted.  
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Table 5. Parental involvement and extracurricular activities 
  Treatment Control Difference Std. Error N 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parental involvement      
Parent turns to school in case of problems 0.975 0.478    0.497**  (0.078)   87 
Parents collaborate with school activities 1.000 0.587    0.413**  (0.073)   87 
Extracurricular activities (weekly basis)      
Sports 0.926 0.804 0.122# (0.072) 87 
Art 0.586 0.435 0.151 (0.107) 87 
Religion 0.854 0.109 0.745** (0.073) 87 
Community service 0.415 0.109 0.306** (0.091) 87 
Study group 0.268 0.239 0.029 (0.095) 87 
Tutoring 0.219 0.043 0.176* (0.072) 87 
Language 0.171 0.109 0.062 (0.075) 87 
Job market training 0.414 0.043 0.371** (0.084) 87 
Number of extra-curricular activities 3.853 1.891 1.962** (0.289) 87 
      
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
(1) Sample of home interview respondents with non-missing ítems. 
(2) Treatment subjects are students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar; control subjects are students that participated in the lottery but 
were not drafted.  
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Appendix Table 1. Differences in Pre-Enrollment Characteristics by ITT in Two Subsamples 
 Subsample 1: available test results (N=93) 
Subsample 2: non-missing values in relevant 
survey items (N=87) 
 
Treat-
ment Control 
Differ-
ence Std. Error 
Treat-
ment Control 
Differ-
ence Std. Error 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age 12.285 12.277    0.008    (0.102)   12.305 12.20    0.106    (0.101)   
Male 0.429 0.510   -0.081    (0.105)   0.439 0.52   -0.083    (0.108)   
Preschool 0.763 0.717    0.046    (0.097)   0.784 0.71    0.073    (0.101)   
Public Primary School 0.714 0.720   -0.006    (0.095)   0.732 0.69    0.043    (0.099)   
After school program 0.357 0.320    0.037    (0.100)   0.341 0.33    0.008    (0.103)   
Good/Excellent student 0.547 0.392    0.155    (0.104)   0.537 0.44    0.102    (0.108)   
Avg/Regular student 0.357 0.529   -0.172#   (0.103)   0.366 0.48   -0.112    (0.107)   
Bad student 0.095 0.078    0.017    (0.060)   0.098    0.087    0.011    (0.063)   
Repeated at least one grade 0.167 0.196   -0.029    (0.081)   0.171    0.152    0.019    (0.080)   
Results from pre-test 4.878 4.735    0.143    (0.321)   4.900    4.791    0.109    (0.340)   
Less than 4 in pre-test 0.357 0.412   -0.055    (0.102)   0.341    0.391   -0.050    (0.104)   
Catholic 0.548 0.449    0.099    (0.106)   0.561    0.523    0.038    (0.109)   
Other religions 0.072 0.082   -0.010    (0.056)   0.073    0.091   -0.018    (0.060)   
Number of people in 
household 4.500 4.529   -0.029    (0.326)   4.415    4.283    0.132    (0.334)   
Both parents at home 0.547 0.627   -0.080    (0.103)   0.561    0.587   -0.026    (0.107)   
Only one parent at home 0.166 0.176   -0.010    (0.079)   0.170    0.217   -0.047    (0.086)   
House owners 0.195 0.120    0.075    (0.078)   0.200    0.111    0.089    (0.080)   
Parents' Educ: Primary only 0.643 0.540    0.103    (0.103)   0.610    0.511    0.099    (0.108)   
Parents' Educ: High school  0.119 0.120   -0.001    (0.069)   0.122    0.156   -0.034    (0.075)   
Hhld head works full time 0.810 0.820   -0.010    (0.082)   0.829    0.844   -0.015    (0.081)   
Household income 11287 12650 -1363 (1202)   11315 12682 -1368 (1254) 
Durable goods index 0.348 0.310    0.038    (0.037)   0.340    0.301    0.039    (0.038)   
Cash transfers from 
Government 0.500 0.480    0.020    (0.106)   0.512    0.511    0.001    (0.109)   
# statistically significant at 10%; * statistically significant at 5%; ** statistically significant at 1% 
Treatment subjects are students randomly selected to enter Liceo Jubilar; control subjects are students that participated in the lottery but 
were not drafted.  
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Appendix Table 2: School’s running costs per student (2010 US dollars^). 
Academic and technical staff 1,113 
School Management 298 
Academic Coordination 280 
Teachers 447 
Technical staff (social worker, psychologist) 88 
Utilities and other services 488 
     Utilities 355 
     Other services (janitors, security) 133 
Extracurricular activities 973 
Coordinator 101 
Volunteer staff - imputed value 792 
School trips and outings 80 
Supplies, materials, and other costs 799 
    Books, uniforms and other supplies 102 
    Meals 624 
    Parents’ time 73 
Total Running Costs per Student 3,373 
^ The exchange rate in 2010 was 20 Uruguayan pesos por every US dollar. 
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1
 We are in the process of analyzing third year outcomes.  
2
 Fe y Alegría schools share a strong commitment with the community and a sense of belonging with the organization. They 
promote parental involvement with the school and complement their academic approach with extracurricular activities. Teachers 
in these schools are observationally similar to teachers in public schools. However, they start with a 1 year trial contract and are 
willing to be trained, tutored, and evaluated by more experienced teachers in school (Alcázar & Valdivia, 2005).  
3The school’s website is www.liceojubilar.edu.uy. 
4
 A corporate donation of $100 to a privately managed school gets in return $75 in tax certificates from the government that can 
be used to cancel tax obligations. The remaining $25 can be deducted as expenditure in the filing of the corporate income tax. The 
regime holds as long as the donation does not exceed 5% of the firm’s profits if the firm is a first time donor, or 10% if she has 
donated before. 
5
 A small fraction of public school students attends after-school programs financed by the government, which also offer academic 
support and/or extracurricular activities. 
6
 In public schools, principals are not able to select their staff. Public school teachers select the schools they want to work in once 
a year on the basis of seniority and some qualifications. The principal cannot intervene in this choice. As public employees, 
teachers are also very difficult to fire. Due to this dynamic, problematic public schools (in particular those with a high fraction of 
disadvantaged students), end up disproportionately with unqualified young teachers, and experience high staff rotation. 
7We could only complete 34 surveys out of 43 in the group not satisfying the inclusion criteria. The information presented in 
Column (2) is thus a subsample of the full group. 
8One of the 101 original observations refused to participate in all instances of the study. 
9We can think of several reasons why none of the students in the control group attended a private secondary school, despite having 
attended private schools during primary education. First, in 2010 there were three private primary schools in the neighborhood but 
only one secondary school, Liceo Jubilar.  Second, one of the private elementary schools, attended by half of the private school 
students, was supported by a foundation that provides private school scholarships to students in poverty. We are not aware of any 
similar program at the time going on at the middle school level. Third, private secondary education is usually more expensive than 
elementary education.  The population that applies for a placement at Liceo Jubilar is among the poorest in the nation and unlikely 
to be able to afford a private school. Most of those going to a private school during the elementary stage had probably been 
awarded scholarships. Distance from other private secondary schools appears as an additional barrier to access this option. 
10
 We assigned each volunteer an hourly wage corresponding to the activity the subject was developing at the institution. This 
wage was computed by taking into consideration the hourly prices paid by the school for similar activities.  
11 We cannot attribute the results to the effects of competition because the school was not yet competing for students 
or public funding in 2010. The continuous need of private funding and new competing private initiatives may increase 
the pressure for accountability and results in the future.  
 
